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I.  Introduction 
In 1974, David Mayhew revealed a trend in congressional elections suggesting 
that the number of „marginal districts‟ declined from the 1950s to the 1970s.  That is, the 
number of districts won with between 50% and 60% of the vote had decreased, while the 
number of districts won with more than 60% of the vote had increased (Mayhew 1974a
1
).  
Although Mayhew did not provide evidence as to the causal mechanism of this 
phenomenon, he gave several conjectures.  This paper explores one of Mayhew‟s 
possible causal mechanisms, examining the theory that candidates “have been profiting 
not from any exertions of their own but from changes in voter attitudes” (Mayhew 
1974a
2
).   
The scope of this paper entails investigating whether the impetus for the increase 
in vote margins is Tiebout Sorting.  The traditional theory of Tiebout Sorting holds that 
“consumer-voters” will sort themselves in a fashion such that they are “picking that 
community which best satisfies [their] preference pattern for public goods” (Tiebout 
1956
3
).  Although the strong version of this model is not being considered, even a weak 
version suggests that over an extended period of time consumer-voters within a given 
area will become more homogeneous with regard to their view of government services as 
they sort themselves into and out of a given area.  With this in mind, consumer-voters 
will vote together more and more often over time because of the growing similarity of 
their preferences.  Thus, this results in higher vote margins because consumer-voters will 
                                                 
1
Mayhew, David R. (1974a). “Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals.” Polity, 6:295-317. 
2Mayhew, David R. (1974a). “Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals.‟  Polity, 6:295-317. 
3Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure.”  The Journal of Political Economy, 64:416-
24. 
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vote in bloc for the candidate closest to their increasingly uniform attitudes towards 
government.   
The way in which we explore this notion stands in stark contrast to the existing 
literature both of the Tiebout Sorting and the Vanishing Marginals.  In regard to Tiebout 
Sorting, we argue that the commonly employed measurement for Tiebout Sorting, 
ascertaining whether or not there has been an increase in stratification for given public 
goods over time, is fundamentally flawed as it does not recognize the role of the political 
system as a body which mediates preferences between individuals and implemented 
government services.  This fundamental flaw in the literature is alleviated through 
invoking vote margin as a measurement of Tiebout Sorting.  Specifically, we do this 
through our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: If the margin by which a candidate wins in a given district  
increases, then we will observe a corresponding increase in the  
homogeneity of preferences of consumer-voters within that specific  
district.  The reverse will hold as well. 
 
 
That is, we would expect a U-shaped relationship (a quadratic relationship) between our 
measure of homogeneity and vote margin: when a district becomes increasingly 
homogeneous on either extreme of the U-shaped relationship, vote margin should rise; 
moreover, when a district becomes increasingly heterogeneous between these two 
homogeneous extremes, vote margin should fall.  The use of exploring homogeneity 
through a U-shaped relationship is a novel approach in both the Tiebout Sorting and 
Vanishing Marginals literature. 
 Further, we call into question whether the way in which the traditional notion of 
Tiebout Sorting, consumer-voters “picking that community which best satisfies [their] 
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preference pattern for public goods” (Tiebout 19564), is an accurate portrayal of how 
real-world people act.  Factors such as socioeconomic stratification and normative beliefs 
are important determinants of individual behavior; social strife affects sorting, and people 
are not merely heartless calculators searching for the highest gains from public goods.  
As such, we introduce two types of Tiebout Sorting: traditional Tiebout Sorting, referring 
to the notion of consumer-voters self-selecting into districts where the basket of goods 
provided most closely matches their preferences, and expanded Tiebout Sorting, referring 
to the sorting of public goods preferences that is a result of the spatial sorting through 
ideological and economic factors independent of public goods preferences.  Explicitly 
stated:   
 
Hypothesis 2: The pattern identified in the first hypothesis is driven by  
both traditional and expanded Tiebout Sorting. 
 
 
Note that we are using an expansive definition of a public good.  For example, while one 
could trivially show that public schooling is neither non-rivalrous nor non-excludable, it 
is still considered a public good by our definition because of the government‟s role in 
public schools. 
In regards to the increase in vote margins, the literature explaining this pattern 
commonly offers one-shot changes in the 1950 to 1970 time range to explain why vote 
margins have increased.  These explanations, however, prove to be exceedingly deficient 
if this trend is not one from the 1950 to 1970 time range but rather one whose breadth 
encompasses the entire twentieth century.  Thus, we will show that this trend of 
increasing vote margins spans the entire twentieth century and that a mechanism that is 
                                                 
4Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure.”  The Journal of Political Economy, 64:416-
24. 
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not one-shot, but rather fluid over time such as Tiebout Sorting, will more properly 
explain this pattern in vote margins.  That is, we introduce our third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The observation made by David Mayhew is a portion of a 
longer trend stationary pattern in an increase in vote margins. 
 
 
Thus, we apply the never before used methodology of expanding vote margins to the 
timeframe of the twentieth century and explore this data through the tools of time-series 
econometrics. 
In pursuit of these assertions, this paper is divided into four further sections.  The 
following two sections will provide a literature review for the Vanishing Marginals and 
Tiebout Sorting as well as the context in which this analysis fits.  After these sections we 
will introduce and conduct our econometric analyses.  Finally, the last section will 
summarize the results of the econometric analysis and provide a discussion of their 
meaning. 
II. Vanishing Marginals 
There are four general categories of explanations for the increase in vote margins.  
The first explains this trend through the process of gerrymandering (McAdams and 
Johannes 1988
5
; Tufte 1973
6
; Tufte 1974
7
).  Although this is the common explanation put 
forth by the media, recent academic evidence has suggested this is not a major cause 
(Carson, Crespin, and Finocchiaro 2007
8): “one need only look back at the last partisan 
                                                 
5
 McAdams, John C., and John R. Johannes (1988). “Congressmen, Perquisites, and Elections.”  Journal of 
Politics, 50(2):412-39. 
6
 Tufte, Edward R. (1973). “The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems.” American 
Political Science Review, 67(2):540-54. 
7
 Tufte, Edward R. (1974). “Communication.”  American Political Science Review.  68(1):211-13. 
8
 Carson, Jamie, Michael Crespin, and Charles Finocchiaro, and David Rohde (2007). “Redistricting and 
Party Polarization in the U.S.  House of Representatives.” American Politics Research 35(6): 878-904. 
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era, when redistricting was not a significant factor, or to the contemporary Senate, whose 
ideological and partisan patterns mirror those of the House, to realize that other, more 
powerful forces are at work” (Mann and Ornstein 20069).  A second argument claims that 
this change is due to changes in voter attitudes or behavior (Burnham 1974
10
; Cover 
1977
11
; Ferejohn 1977
12
).  The third category explains this trend by asserting that quality 
challengers have decreased (Jacobson 1978
13
; Mann 1978
14
; Mann and Wolfinger 1980
15
; 
Jacobson 1992
16
).  However, this explanation can be partly tied into the previous two 
perspectives: “strategic challengers realize their chances of winning are greater 
following” a constituency preference change in their favor, gerrymandering or migration, 
and are thus “more likely to enter” a political contest (Cox and Katz 200217; Carson, 
Engstrom, and Roberts 2006
18
).  The last group of explanations suggests a change in the 
behavior of elected officials, notably through greater responsiveness to constituency 
needs, increased constituency services, and increased strategic position-taking (Mayhew 
                                                 
9
 Mann, T.  E., & Ornstein, N.  J. (2006). The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and 
How To Get It Back on Track.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
10
 Burnham, Walter D. (1974). “Communications.”  American Political Science Review.  68(1): 207-11. 
11
 Cover, Albert D. (1977). “One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in 
Congressional Elections.”  American Journal of Political Science  21(3):523-41. 
12
 Ferejohn, John A. (1977). “On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections.” American 
Political Science Review 71(1):166-76. 
13
 Jacobson, Gary C. (1978). “The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections.” American 
Political Science Review 72(2):469-91. 
14
 Mann, Thomas E. (1978). Unsafe at Any Margin. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 
15
 Mann, Thomas E. and Raymond Wolfinger (1980). “Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections.” 
American Political Science Review 74:617-634. 
16
 Jacobson, Gary C. (1992). The Politics of Congressional Elections, 3
rd
 edition.  New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers. 
17
 Cox, Gary W., and Jonathan N. Katz (2002) Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences 
of the Reapportionment Revolution.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
18
 Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts (2006). “Redistricting, Candidate Entry, and 
the Politics of Nineteenth-Century U.S. House Elections.”  Midwest Political Science Association 50(2): 
283-293. 
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1974a
19
; Cover and Mayhew 1977
20
; Fiorina 1977a
21
; Fiorina 1977b
22
; Cain, Ferejohn, 
and Fiorina 1987
23
; McAdams and Johannes 1988
24
; Jacobson 1992
25
).   
It follows that there is a striking gap in this literature arising from a widespread 
focus on the 1950 to 1970 time period for finding a causal mechanism.  It has been 
suggested that this trend has existed far longer than originally noted by Mayhew.  In fact, 
there is evidence that the trend discovered by Mayhew is actually just a portion of one 
starting in 1896 (Gross and Garand 1984
26
).  Thus, if the increase in vote margins is 
indeed a pattern with its origin in the beginning of the twentieth century, as will be later 
shown, a comprehensive approach to this question requires data and an answer, or 
answers, which explain the entire history of this trend rather than simply the 1950 to 1970 
focused explanations common in the literature.  As such, we introduce Tiebout Sorting as 
it serves as this comprehensive explanation. 
III.   Tiebout Sorting 
The rationale behind traditional Tiebout Sorting can be intuitively understood 
through an example from Charles Tiebout: 
 
                                                 
19
 Mayhew, David R. (1974a). “Congressional elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals.”  Polity 
6:295-317. 
20
 Cover, Albert, and David Mayhew (1977). “Congressional Dynamics and the Decline of Competitive 
Congressional Elections.”  In Congress Reconsidered, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer.  
New York: Praeger. 
21
 Fiorina, Morris P. (1977a). “The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It.” American 
Political Science Review. 71(1):177-81. 
22
 Fiorina, Morris P. (1977b). Congress: The Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven: Yale 
University Press Publishers. 
23
 Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina (1987). The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and 
Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press Publishers. 
24
 McAdams, John C., and John R. Johannes (1988). “Congressmen, Perquisites, and Elections.” Journal of 
Politics 50(2):412 -39. 
25
 Jacobson, Gary C. (1992). The Politics of Congressional Elections, 3
rd
 edition. New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers. 
26
 Gross, Donald A., and James C. Garand (1984). “The Vanishing Marginals, 1824 – 1980.” Journal of 
Politics  46(1):224-37. 
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Consider for a moment the case of the city resident about to move to the 
suburbs.  What variables will influence his choice of a municipality? If he 
has children, a high level of expenditures on schools may be important.  
Another person may prefer a community with a municipal golf course.  
The availability and quality of such facilities and services as beaches, 
parks, police protection, roads, and parking facilities will enter into the 
decision-making process.   
(Tiebout 1956
27
) 
 
Empirical testing of Tiebout Sorting has been a strongly active research area 
focusing on (i) whether there is actually choice in public goods between communities, (ii) 
whether the implications of Tiebout Sorting can be observed, and (iii) whether Tiebout 
Sorting can be observed.  The first question is generally settled in that there are 
observable differences between public goods offered by different communities (Fischel 
1981
28
; Hamilton 1982
29
).  The second topic area, testing the implications of Tiebout 
Sorting, has involved deriving locational equilibriums and testing if these equilibriums 
are consistent with real world data.  This is strongly tied to the third area of study, 
observing Tiebout Sorting, which has been thoroughly studied, yet is still disputed.  
Empirical tests have searched for Tiebout Sorting through the examination of schools 
(Epple, Figlio, and Romano 2004
30
; Hoxby 1999
31
; Hoxby 2000
32
; Fernaindez and 
Rogerson 1998
33
; Nechyba 1999
34
; Nechyba 2000
35
), the number of jurisdictions 
                                                 
27
 Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure.” The Journal of Political Economy, 
64:416-24. 
28
 Fischel, William A (1975). “Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in 
Suburban Communities.”  In Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls,  E. Mills and W. Oates, eds. 
Lexington, MA: Heath-Lexington Books. 
29
 Hamilton, Bruce W. (1975).  Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments.  
Urban Studies 12: 205-11. 
30 Epple, Dennis, David Figlio, and Richard Romano (2004). "Competition Between Private and Public 
Schools: Testing Stratification and Pricing Predictions." Journal of Public Economics 8(7-8):1215-1245. 
31
 Hoxby, Caroline (1999). “The Productivity of Schools and Other Local Public Goods Producers.” 
Journal of Public Economics 74(1):1-30. 
32
 Hoxby, Caroline (2000). “Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?” 
American Economic Review 90(5):1209-1238. 
33
 Fernaindez, Raquel and Richard Rogerson (1997). “Keeping People Out: Income Distribution, Zoning, 
and the Quality of Public Education.” International Economic Review 38(1):23-42. 
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(Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby 2000
36
), redistribution (Wooders 1999
37
), zoning (Glomm 
and Lagunoff 1999
38
), general public goods (Perroni and Scharf 2001
39
), environmental 
quality (Kahn 2000
40
; Banzhaf and Walsh 2008
41
), and more.  However, much of these 
two subfields have a strong methodological breakdown because the most commonly used 
measurement has entailed determining the presence or absence of Tiebout sorting by 
ascertaining whether or not there has been an increase in stratification for given public 
goods over time (Oates 2005
42
).  That is, through the commonly used criterion that an 
increase in stratification for given public goods over time is indicative of Tiebout Sorting 
there is an implicit assumption that consumer-voters will get together and implement 
their optimal choice for a given policy.  This, however, is not the case.  In the United 
States the policy preferences of a consumer-voter are mediated through elected officials.  
Thus, the voting booth does not give the option to fill in how much money to spend on a 
given program, or even a choice between two amounts for the vast majority of issues.  
Rather, the choice given tends to be restricted to Democrat or Republican, and 
occasionally a member of an independent party.  Further, the policy goals of these elected 
                                                                                                                                                 
34
 Nechyba, Thomas (1999). “School Finance Induced Migration and Stratification Patterns: The Impact of 
Private School Vouchers.” Journal of Public Economic Theory 1(1):5-50. 
35
 Nechyba, Thomas (2000). “Mobility, Targeting, and Private-School Vouchers." American Economic 
Review 90(1): 130-46. 
36
 Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and Caroline Hoxby (2000). “Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous 
Communities.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7859. 
37
 Wooders, Myrna (1999). “Multijurisdictional Economies, the Tiebout Hypothesis, and Sorting.” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96(19): 10585- 87. 
38
 Glomm, Gerhard and Roger Lagunoff (1999). “A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary vs. Involuntary 
Provision of Public Goods.” Review of Economic Studies 66(3):659-77. 
39
 Perroni, Carlo and Kimberley Scharf (2001). “Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and 
Constitutional Choices.” Review of Economic Studies 68(1):133-154. 
40
 Kahn, Matthew E. (2000). “Smog Reduction's Impact on California County Growth.” Journal of 
Regional Science 40(3):565-582. 
41
 Banzhaf, H. S. and Randall P. Walsh (2008). “Do People Vote with Their Feet? An Empirical Test of 
Tiebout's Mechanism.” American Economic Review 98(3):843-863 
42
 Oates, Wallace E. (2005). “The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model.” In The Tiebout Model at Fifty: 
Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates, ed. William A. Fischel, 21-45. Cambridge, MA: 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
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officials may not match the preferences of a consumer-voter.  A more accurate 
methodology would be to consider the mediation of preferences of consumer-voters 
through the goals of elected officials.  For example, consider the goals of congressmen as 
posited by Richard Fenno: 
 
Goal 1 - Satisfying Constituents: It could be that constituency  
considerations come back ultimately to an interest in re- 
election.  But one observes congressmen taking account of  
constituency reaction long before and much more  
frequently than they worry explicitly about gain or loss of 
votes in the next election. 
 
Goal 2 - Intra-Washington Influence: These include going along with  
one's party leadership, favor-trading among fellow 
legislators, and following the lead of the administration, 
particularly if the President is of the deciding legislator's 
party. 
 
Goal 3 - Good Public Policy: Most legislators have their conception of  
good public policy, and act partly to carry that conception  
into being. 
(Kingdon 1973
43
; Kingdon 1977
44
) 
 
 
Therefore, to look for a link between consumer-voter preferences and those policies that 
are actually implemented will be an inaccurate measure of Tiebout Sorting.  Succinctly, 
the commonly employed measurement is not reliable; outcomes are in reality “a product 
of some unknown combination of constituency characteristics, members‟ personal 
preferences, the underlying agenda of votes, and party pressure” (Carson, Jenkins, and 
Schickler 2004
45
). 
                                                 
43
 Kingdon, John W. (1973). Congressmen's Voting Decisions.  New York: Harper & Row Publishers. 
44
 Kingdon, John W. (1977). “Models of Legislative Voting.” Journal of Politics 39(3):563-95. 
45
 Carson, Jamie, Jeffery Jenkins, and Eric Schickler (2004). “Constituency Cleavages and Congressional 
Parties: Measuring Homogeneity and Polarization, 1857-1913.” Social Science History 28(4):537-573. 
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Further, these tests tend to lack a focus on how individuals actually act; 
socioeconomic stratification and ideology as well as one‟s consideration of public goods 
provided influence spatial sorting with respect to demand for public goods.  As such, we 
will augment Tiebout Sorting by considering it in both traditional and expanded versions.  
Traditional Tiebout Sorting refers to consumer-voters self-selecting into districts where 
the basket of goods provided most closely matches their preferences.  On the other hand, 
expanded Tiebout Sorting refers to the sorting of public goods preferences that is a result 
of the spatial sorting by ideological and economic factors independent of public goods 
preferences.  As an intuitive example, consider the following hypothetical: a group of low 
socioeconomic status will be restricted both in housing choices, due to the price of 
housing, as well as in availability of suitable jobs in a given location, due to the need to 
match demanded and supplied skill sets.  Further, note that individuals within a group of 
low socioeconomic status will tend to have more homogeneous preferences for public 
goods than those not in that group.
46
  As such, it follows that if there is spatial sorting due 
to housing choices and job availability there will consequently be the sorting of public 
goods preferences.  Thus, while consideration of public goods does not drive the sorting, 
it is nonetheless a product of the spatial sorting resulting from housing and job concerns. 
IV. Econometric Models 
From these insights follows the mutually supporting relationship between the 
Vanishing Marginals and Tiebout Sorting.  In particular, the relevance of Tiebout Sorting 
is best measured through the vote margins of consumer-voters for candidates, and 
Tiebout Sorting can serve as a causal explanation for the Vanishing Marginals.  This is so 
because the Vanishing Marginals acknowledges the mediation required; voting for a 
                                                 
46
 General Social Survey: http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/GSS+Website/ 
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candidate is a direct action by a consumer-voter, and voting homogeneously in bloc is a 
measurement of the effectiveness of Tiebout Sorting.  The exact relationship will be 
made clear in this section as we introduce our three models to provide support for the 
position that traditional and expanded Tiebout Sorting account for an increase in vote 
margins over the twentieth century. 
When investigating the increase in vote margins, there are three general sets of 
data used to investigate this issue.  The first set encompasses data from elections and the 
creation of districts, notably for the explanations of gerrymandering and the decrease of 
quality challengers (Gross and Garand 1984
47
; Alford and Brady 1993
48
).  The second 
use of data in this field analyzes evidence garnered directly from constituents in forms 
such as surveys, most common when investigating a change in voter attitudes (Cain, 
Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987
49
).  Finally, the third method used in gathering data entails 
collecting information directly from assistants of an elected official, a method generally 
used in looking at change in the behavior of elected officials (Johannes and McAdams 
1981
50
; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987
51
).  A less common approach involves 
obtaining and scrutinizing data collected directly from members of Congress (Herrera 
and Yawn 1999).  For our first model we employ data from elections and the creation of 
                                                 
47
 Gross, Donald A., and James C.  Garand (1984). “The Vanishing Marginals, 1824 – 1980.” Journal of 
Politics  46(1):224-37. 
48
 Alford, John R., and David Brady (1993). “Personal Partisan Advantage in U.S.  Congressional 
Elections, 1846-1990.” In Congress Reconsidered, ed.  Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer.  New 
York: Praeger 
49
 Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina (1987). The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and 
Electoral Independence.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
50
 McAdams, John C., and John R. Johannes (1981). “Does Casework Matter?: A Reply to Professor 
Fiorina.”  American Journal of Political Science  25(3):581-604. 
51
 Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina (1987). The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and 
Electoral Independence.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press Publishers. 
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districts evidence.  The second and third models use these data as well as information 
garnered directly from constituents in forms such as surveys.  Specifically: 
(A) Model I: This model will establish that the increase in vote margins is a  
trend stationary pattern that has spanned the twentieth century. 
(B) Model II: Our second model will use a blunt measurement over a long span 
to establish that Tiebout Sorting (not distinguishing here between 
traditional and expanded sorting) is a force of long-term spatial 
homogenization in the United States.   
(C) Model III: Finally, we will investigate the nuances of this mechanism such 
  that it can be determined whether this homogenization mechanism  
is both parts of our augmented understanding of Tiebout Sorting. 
(A1) Econometric Analysis I 
 Of paramount importance to understanding this econometric analysis is 
knowledge of Mayhew‟s discovery regarding the Vanishing Marginals.  As can be seen 
in Chart 1, while Mayhew looked at a time period spanning from the 1950s to the 1970s 
to find that the number of districts won with between 50% and 60% of the vote had 
decreased, while the number of districts won with more than 60% of the vote had 
increased, this observation holds true for the time period observed in this study, 1900 to 
1992, and possibly longer.  It follows that if a set of independent variables explains the 
change in vote margin over time they likewise explain why the vote margin has increased 
over time. 
 To fully understand the factors at work, we must determine whether, for this 
pattern in the data, there exists a unit root. Specifically, if there is a unit root then the 
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pattern is difference stationary and an exogenous shock will result in a new level at which 
vote margin will continue to increase.  On the other hand, if there is no unit root then this 
pattern will be trend stationary and an exogenous shock will cause vote margin to 
temporarily move away from the trend before returning to it.  Intuitively, this considers 
whether a scandal, innovation, or other shock to the political system will have a 
permanent (difference stationary) or temporary (trend stationary) effect. 
We test the existence of the unit root through, first, the weaker test on aggregated 
time-series data for vote margins by year and, second, by using a stronger panel data 
test.
52
  For the weaker test, we utilize the commonly used Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS (ERS) test.  The null hypothesis of 
both of these tests is that there exists a unit root.  Further, to determine lag length we use 
both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as well as the Schwarz Criterion (BIC) for 
the sake of robustness, though they both result in a lag length of zero. 
  Results Table 1 shows that, in this weaker test, we fail to reject that the pattern 
possesses a unit root and, consequently, are led to believe it is difference stationary.  
However, a closer examination of the results brings a large degree of ambiguity into what 
should be concluded from this result.  Specifically, notice that the ADF test barely fails to 
reject that the pattern possesses a unit root at the 10% level, while the ERS test does 
reject that this pattern has a unit root at the 10% level.  While traditionally for the 
existence of a unit root to be rejected it must be rejected at the 5% level, here there are 
circumstances that prevent us from drawing the hasty conclusion that we should view this 
                                                 
52
 The reasoning behind our methodology for choosing tests to determine if there exists a unit root and the 
optimal number of lags for those tests is explained in the appendix under sections III and IV. 
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pattern as having a unit root.  Consider the following two explanations, both of which are 
possible from the results of the ADF and ERS tests.  
Upon inspection of Chart 2, there appears to be a shock in this pattern from the 
early 1930s through the late 1950s.  If we suppose this is trend stationary it would not at 
all be unexpected for us to fail to reject the existence of a unit root because the exogenous 
shock between the lines is such a large part of the dataset (Diebold and Senhadji 1996
53
).  
By contrast, this pattern may have a unit root, be difference stationary, and have had an 
exogenous shock in the early 1930s moving it to a new, permanent, and lower level as 
well as a second exogenous shock moving it back to the previous level. 
To shed light on this ambiguity we move to our stronger and more comprehensive 
test by employing two commonplace panel unit root tests that do not require balanced 
panel data, the Fisher ADF and Fisher PP tests.  Further, we use the Akaike Information 
Criterion to determine the number of lags used in each time-series section of the panel 
data.
54
  We observe that the optimal lag fluctuates between 0 and 3 for each time-series 
section of the panel data and, consequently, we will use the maximum lag for the full 
panel test, as is generally practiced (Österholm
 
2004
55
).  Displayed in Results Table 2 are 
the results for each of the Fisher ADF and Fisher PP tests for 0 through 3 lags.  Each test 
delivers the same conclusion: we reject the null hypothesis that there exists a unit root.  
Thus, we are able to conclude that this pattern is trend stationary. 
                                                 
53 Diebold, Francis X. and Abdelhak S. Senhadji (1996). “The Uncertain Unit Root in Real GNP: 
Comment.” The American Economic Review 86(5):1291-1298. 
54
 Like our previous tests for the existence of a unit root and criterion for determining optimal lag length, an 
explanation of our methodology can be found in sections III and IV of the appendix. 
55
 Österholm, P. (2004), “Killing Four Unit Root Birds in the US Economy with Three Panel Unit Root 
Test Stones.” Applied Economics Letters 11(4), 213-216. 
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Note: This aggregated vote margin data by year is used in our first test for 
the existence of a unit root.  The elections combined to create this 
aggregation are the data that are defined as competitive (races with major-
party opposition where there is no incumbent or where there is an 
incumbent that faced major-party opposition in both a given election and 
the previous election). 
 
The aggregated data by year can be seen to the left, the graph of the 
aggregated data can be seen above, and the location of the exogenous 
shock can be seen below. 
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Results Table 1 
ADF Test, AIC and BIC 
suggest 0 lags necessary 
Lags: 0  t-Statistic 
1% level  -4.1706 
5% level  -3.5107 
10% level  -3.1855 
ADF Test 
Statistic -3.0059 
ERS Test, AIC and BIC 
suggest 0 lags necessary 
Lags: 0  t-Statistic 
1% level  -3.77 
5% level  -3.19 
10% level  -2.89 
ERS Test 
Statistic -3.0713 
 
Results Table 2 
 
Test # of Lags Chi
2
 Prob > Chi
2
 Conclusion 
Fisher ADF 0 4517.2793 0.000 No Unit Root 
Fisher ADF 1 4545.7366 0.000 No Unit Root 
Fisher ADF 2 4771.4298 0.000 No Unit Root 
Fisher ADF 3 4849.882 0.000 No Unit Root 
Fisher PP 0 4517.2793 0.000 No Unit Root 
Fisher PP 1 1986.9359 0.000 No Unit Root 
Fisher PP 2 1554.0046 0.000 No Unit Root 
Fisher PP 3 1257.7595 0.000 No Unit Root 
Results Table 1 contains the results of the ADF and ERS 
tests for the aggregated vote margin data.  Both the ADF 
and ERS tests can be interpreted as follows: if the 
magnitude of the (negative) test statistic is larger than the 
t-Statistic at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level for its 
corresponding test then the null hypothesis that there is no 
unit root is rejected at that level. 
 
For the ADF test, we note that -3.1855 (10% level t-
Statistic) is larger in magnitude than -3.0059 (ADF Test 
Statistic) so we fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% 
level. 
 
For the ERS test, notice that -3.0713 (ERS Test Statistic) 
is larger in magnitude than -2.89 (10% level t-Statistic) 
but smaller in magnitude than -3.19 (5% level t-Statistic). 
Consequently, we fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 
5% level, but we do reject the null hypothesis at the 10% 
level. 
Results Table 2 contains the 
results of the Fisher ADF and 
Fisher PP tests for the entire 
panel dataset repeated for 0 
through 3 lags.  The null 
hypothesis is that there exists 
a unit root for both the Fisher 
ADF and PP tests.  
Consequently, a Prob > Chi
2
 
value of 0.000 for each of the 
tests at every choice of lag 
length rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 1% level. 
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(A2) Nature of the Exogenous Shock 
 While the exogenous shock is originally viewed as a weakness of the data set – it 
adds ambiguity to our first, weaker set of unit root tests – there is also a resulting 
strength: it provides us the opportunity to explore the nuances of this trend stationary 
pattern.  This period from the early 1930s to the late 1950s coincides exactly with the 
realignment of the Democratic and Republican parties.  In particular, there was a distinct 
decline in the level of partisanship as well as a pattern of political moderation in both the 
Democratic and Republican parties; consequently, “the parties became more diverse 
internally, creating considerable ambiguity about the extent to which the parties differed” 
(Stonecash 2006
56
).  Further, this creates a knowledge problem as it has been shown that 
voters are more knowledgeable of party differences than individual candidate differences 
(Popkin 1994
57
).  It follows that during this period we would see a relatively less efficient 
transmission of voter preferences from individuals to elected officials.   Thus, one would 
expect an indiscriminate drop in vote margins as well as a more reserved slope in the 
realignment period relative to the pre- and post-realignment period.  As can be observed 
in Chart 3 through Chart 6, this is in fact exactly what happens; the slope of a line fit to 
the 1900 to 1930 period (pre-realignment) is 0.0011 and one fit to the 1962 to 1992 
period (post-realignment) is 0.0009 whereas in the 1932 to 1960 timeframe (realignment) 
the slope of such a line is much smaller at 0.0001. 
                                                 
56
 Stonecash, Jeffrey M. (2006). Political Parties Matter: Realignment and the Return of Partisan Voting. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
57
 Popkin, Samuel L. (1994). The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persusasion in Presidential 
Elections. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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Chart 4: Winner's % of Two-Party Vote Share Over Time
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Chart 5: Winner's % of Two-Party Vote Share Over Time 
(1932-1960)
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Chart 6: Winner's % of Two-Party Vote Share Over Time 
(1962-1992)
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(B) Econometric Analysis II 
The second econometric analysis considered establishes that Tiebout Sorting (not 
distinguishing here between traditional and expanded sorting) is a long-term spatially 
homogenizing force in the United States.  There are two datasets that will be used for this 
econometric analysis.  The first dataset comes from E. Scott Adler‟s Congressional 
District Dataset, which “includes a wide range of economic, social, and geographic 
information for every U.S. congressional district” from the 78th Congress through 103rd 
Congress.
58
  Data from every other year will be used, as data are provided at each 
biennial election for the United States House of Representatives. 
This test explores the expected U-shaped relationship (a quadratic relationship) 
between our measure of homogeneity and vote margin.  That is, if there exists such a U-
shaped relationship then it would imply that as a district becomes increasingly 
homogeneous on either extreme of a measurement of homogeneity, then vote margin 
should rise.  Moreover, when a district becomes increasingly heterogeneous between 
these two homogeneous extremes, vote margin should fall.  We will use the percent urban 
population in a district as a broad yet extremely effective measurement of heterogeneity. 
Consider the strengths of this measurement in testing for a U-shaped relationship.  
In regards to income and occupation, evidence shows that there is a “wage gap between 
urban and rural workers occurs across societies and time periods” (Glaeser and Mare 
1994
59
), and while the urban wage premium has fallen over time, the earnings gap 
between those who work in a large city and those who work outside it is still larger than 
the earnings gap between the races or between union and non-union members” (Freeman 
                                                 
58
 Congressional District Dataset: http://socsci.colorado.edu/~esadler/Congressional_District_Data.html 
59
 Glaeser, Edward L. and David C. Mare (1994). “Cities and Skills.” Journal of Labor Economics 
19(2):316-342. 
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1984
60
).  This can be explained partially through the positive externalities provided by 
cities as posited by the tradition of Marshall.  There are three reasons, this literature 
claims, for the localization of similar occupations:  
 
First, the concentration of several firms in a single location offers a pooled 
market for workers with industry-specific skills, ensuring both a lower 
probability of unemployment and a lower probability of labor shortage.  
Second, localized industries can support the production of nontradable 
specialized inputs.  Third, informational spillovers can give clustered 
firms a better production function than isolated producers.  
      (Krugman 1991
61
; Marshall 1890
62
) 
 
 
That is, it is an efficient result for workers possessing a given industry-specific skill set to 
group together spatially.  This theory has been shown to be supported by real world 
observation, notably in the classic example of the American Manufacturing Belt; “[t]he 
steady movement of the geographical center of manufacturing toward the West and South 
did not involve any decline in manufacturing or lessening of its density in the New 
England or Eastern states. It was accompanied, indeed by a growing concentration of 
certain branches of industry in those regions” (Clark 192963).  However, this trend is not 
restricted to manufacturing and regional sorting.  It can be observed in the agricultural, 
manufacturing, and service sectors of the economy beyond regional sorting throughout 
the United States (Kim 1995
64
).  While the explanations and predictions about future 
impact of this geographic concentration of industry-specific skill sets are disputed, the 
                                                 
60
 Freeman, R. (1984). “Longitudinal Analyses of the Effects of Trade Unions,” Journal of Labor 
Economics 2:1-26. 
61
 Krugman, Paul (1991). “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
108: 551-576. 
62
 Marshall, Alfred (1890). Principles of Economics. London: Macmillian. 
63
 Charles, Camille Z. (2003). “The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 29:167-207. 
64
 Kim, Sukkoo (1998). “Economic Integration and Convergence: U.S. Regions, 1840-1987.” The Journal 
of Economic History 58(3):659-683. 
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existence of this trend is not.  The scope of urban-rural differences is more apparent with 
the consideration of a wider range of socioeconomic variables beyond income and 
occupation: 
 
In the 1950s rural poverty was far more severe than urban poverty, with 
over a third of rural residents in poverty compared to 15% in urban areas 
and 18% in central cities. The combination of national economic growth 
and substantial outmigration from depressed areas brought a precipitous 
drop in rural poverty, and by the late 1960s rural poverty had fallen to 
18% (compared to 13% in central cities). During the mid-1970s the 
poverty rate in rural areas continued to decline to a low of 14% in 1978, 
but hard economic times in the late 1970s and early 1980s brought new 
increases in rural poverty, until the rate reached 18% in the mid-1980s. 
The 1980s saw a significant increase in all poverty rates. By the decade's 
end the 17% poverty rate in rural America nearly equaled the 19% rate in 
the central cities. Although there are compositional differences between 
the rural and urban poor (the rural poor are more likely to be white, 
elderly, or in two-parent households with at least one worker), those who 
are most vulnerable in the central cities-blacks, children, and those in 
female-headed households-are even more likely to be poor if they live in 
rural area.                                
  (Tickamyer and Cynthia M. Duncan 1990
65
) 
 
 
That is, the use of this measurement further invokes data on age, class, gender, and race 
differences seen on a rural-urban comparison (Tickamyer and Duncan 1990
66
; Charles 
2003
67
; Strait 2001
68
).  Finally, age, class, gender, income, occupation, and race have 
been shown by the General Social Survey to influence preferences for political affiliation 
and public goods.
69
 
                                                 
65
 Tickamyer, Ann R. and Cynthia M. Duncan (1990). “Poverty and Opportunity Structure in Rural 
America.” Annual Review of Sociology 16:67-86. 
66
 Tickamyer, Ann R. and Cynthia M. Duncan (1990). “Poverty and Opportunity Structure in Rural 
America.” Annual Review of Sociology 16:67-86. 
67
 Charles, Camille Z. (2003). “The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 29:167-207. 
68
 Strait, John B. (2001). “The Disparate Impact of Metropolitan Economic Change: The Growth of 
Extreme Poverty Neighborhoods, 1970-1990.” Economic Geography 77(3): 272-305. 
69
 General Social Survey: http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/GSS+Website/ 
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The second source of data will be Gary King‟s Elections to the United States 
House of Representatives, 1898-1992 Dataset containing the number of votes for 
Democratic and Republican candidates for each biennial House election grouped by 
congressional district.  Only data from 1942 to 1992, the elections of the 77
th
 through 
103
rd
 House of Representatives, will be used such that it corresponds to the 
Congressional District Dataset.  Also included is information stating whether there was 
an incumbent running and, if so, their party affiliation.
70
  From this dataset the variable 
VoteMargin will be calculated as the winner‟s percentage of the two-party vote share.  
This will be used as the dependent variable.   
It is important to note that while public goods are generally provided by local and 
state government, VoteMargin is being calculated through congressional election results, 
a federal government election.  This is because there is a distinct advantage to using 
House election data over local and state election data.  In particular, whereas the average 
federal election garners participation by roughly half of the voting age population (higher 
in presidential election years and lower in midterm elections), (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady1995
71
; Lijphart 1997
72
; Bennett and Resnick 1990
73
) local and state elections 
commonly elicit the participation of a mere one-fourth of the voting age population 
(Alford and Lee 1968
74
; Morlan 1984
75
; Bridges 1997
76
).  This advantage comes from the 
                                                 
70
Elections to the United States House of Representatives, 1898-1992 Dataset: 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/king/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/TQDSSPRDDZ&
studyListingIndex=1_d7657df4f6008b7fc80aaaf4688d 
71
 Verba, S., K. L. Schlozman, and H. E. Brady (1995). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American 
politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 
72
 Lijphart, A. (1997). “Unequal participation: Democracy‟s unresolved dilemma.” American Political 
Science Review 91:1-14. 
73
 Bennett, S. E., and D. Resnick (1990). “The implications of nonvoting for democracy in the United 
States.” American Journal of Political Science 34:771-802. 
74
 Alford, R. R., and E. C. Lee (1968). “Voting turnout in American cities.” American Political Science 
Review 62:796-813. 
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idea that a large sampling of the preferences of individuals within a given area will 
deliver more accurate results.  Moreover, the varying local and state institutional 
arrangements would have a confounding, as well as less studied and understood, effect on 
the transmission of consumer-voter preferences, whereas House elections are relatively 
more standardized (Hanjal and Lewis 2003
77
).  One possible drawback is that local 
elections may offer a stronger indicator of consumer-voter preferences, as public goods 
are not generally provided at the federal level.  However, House elections do possess a 
strong local component, and local and state elections are also influenced by a national 
component (Brady, David W., Robert D'Onofrio, and Morris P. Fiorina 2000
78
).  
Therefore, while there is a tradeoff between using House election results rather than local 
and state election results for calculating vote margin, House election results provide the 
stronger measure out of these two possibilities. 
In order for these data to give meaningful information regarding the hypotheses, it 
is necessary to control for a number of factors.  Recall the categories of explanations for 
the Vanishing Marginals in the literature.  Thus, we must control for the incumbency 
effect, candidate quality, whether or not an election is competitive, and the effect of 
gerrymandering.  The final category, a change in voter attitude or behavior, is invoked in 
the form of Tiebout Sorting.  To control both for candidate quality and whether or not an 
election is competitive, only races with major-party opposition where there is no 
                                                                                                                                                 
75
 Morlan, R. L (1984). “Municipal versus national election voter turnout: Europe and the United States.” 
Political Science Quarterly 99:457-70. 
76
 Bridges, A (1997). Morning glories: Municipal reform in the southwest. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Univ. Press. 
77
 Hanjal, Zolton L., and Paul G. Lewis (2003). “Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local 
Elections.” Urban Affairs Review 38(5):645-668. 
78
 Brady, David W., Robert D'Onofrio, and Morris P. Fiorina (2000). “The Nationalization of  
Electoral Forces Revisited.” In Continuity and Changes in House Elections, 20th edition, ed. David W. 
Brady, John F. Cogan, and Morris P. Fiorina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
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incumbent or where there is an incumbent that faced major-party opposition in both a 
given election and the previous election will be used.  Further, in the remaining races a 
dummy variable will be used denoting whether or not an incumbent is running.  To 
control for the influence of gerrymandering, a dummy variable will be constructed for 
when districts have been altered.  Finally, as changes in voter turnout often result from 
the competitiveness of a race and the quality of the candidates, it will be controlled for as 
well (Caldeira, Patterson and Markko 1985
79
; Cox, Munger 1989
80
; Huckfeldt et al. 
2007
81
). 
 
 
 
 
 This model provides information as to whether the mechanism explaining the 
change in vote margin over time is Tiebout Sorting without differentiating between the 
traditional and expanded varieties.  Specifically, if the margin by which a candidate wins 
in a given district increases, then there will be a corresponding increase in the 
homogeneity of preferences of consumer-voters within that specific district; further, the 
reverse will hold as well.  An examination of Results Table 3 provides evidence in 
support of this hypothesis.  Further, observe the shape of the line formed between the 
relationship of vote margin and urban heterogeneity; specifically, notice that as a district 
                                                 
79
 Caldeira, Gregory A., Samuel C. Patterson, and Gregory A. Markko (1985). “The Mobilization of  
Voters in Congressional Elections.” Journal of Politics 47:490-509. 
80
 Cox, Gary W. and Michael C. Munger (1989). “Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the  
1982 U.S. House Elections.” American Political Science Review 83:217-31. 
81
 Huckfeldt, Robert, Edward G. Carmines, Jeffrey J. Mondak, and Eric Zeemering (2007). “Information, 
Activation, and Electoral Competition in the 2002 Congressional Elections” Journal of Politics 69:798-
812. 
Econometric Equation 1: 
VoteMarginit = β0 + β1UrbnahetHetit + β2UrbanHetit
2
 + β3Redistit + β4Turnoutit + β5Incit + i + δt + it 
 
 Differenced Equation: 
VoteMarginit = β1UrbnahetHetit + β2UrbanHetit
2
 + β3Redistit + β4Turnoutit + β5Incit + δ + it - it-1  
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becomes increasingly urban there will be an increase in vote margin and when a district 
becomes increasingly not urban there is also an increase in vote margin.  Further, when 
the district becomes increasingly heterogeneous between these two homogeneous 
extremes vote margin will fall.  That is, our expected U-shaped relationship holds. 
First, as a check of the integrity of these results, observe that our dummy variables 
for the incumbency effect (Incumbency), for when district lines have been redrawn 
(Redistricting), and for voter turnout (Turnout) are each statistically significant.  While 
the influence each of these three variables has may differ depending on the context, it is 
expected both intuitively and after an examination of the relevant literature that these 
variables should be statistically significant.  That is, each should have a genuine effect on 
the winner‟s percentage of the two-party vote margin. 
Note the marginal effects: a –0.1397 value change in urban homogeneity (Urban 
Homogeneity), a 0.9787 value increase in urban homogeneity squared (Urban 
Homogeneity
2
), a 0.0552 value increase in incumbency (Incumbency), a 0.0385 value 
increase in redistricting (Redistricting), or a –0.0935 value change in the value for voter 
turnout (Turnout) while holding all other variables constant will correspond to a one-
percent increase in the winner‟s percentage share of the two party vote.  From these 
results we are led to the conclusion that this constitutes evidence in favor of Tiebout 
Sorting.  Over time, vote margins have been increasing, and increasing vote margins are 
correlated with an increase of homogeneity in districts.  While this is a blunt 
measurement by nature, it does invoke information regarding age, class, gender, income, 
occupation and race differences seen over time on a rural-urban comparison.  Preferences 
for public goods can be measured by an individual‟s vote because preferences must be 
   Pizzola  26 
mediated through the political system.  This, however, leads us back to the use of vote 
margins; consumer-voters will vote together more and more often over time because of 
the growing similarity of their preferences.  Thus, the observed higher vote margins 
provide evidence that constituents within districts have increasingly homogeneous 
attitudes towards public goods.    
It is important to note that this model for determining the relevance of Tiebout 
Sorting does not ascertain the specific underlying public good preferences – it merely 
demonstrates that they exist.  Further, it cannot be determined from this model whether 
this phenomenon is an instance of traditional Tiebout Sorting (sorting based on public 
goods provided) or expanded Tiebout Sorting (spatial sorting by ideological and 
economic factors). 
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Chart Table 1 
Decade Number of Relatively 
Homogeneous Districts 
1940s 239 
1950s 247 
1960s 257 
1970s 276 
1980s 280 
 
 
Calculation 
 
The number of relatively homogeneous districts 
was calculated by finding how many districts were 
at least ten percentage points greater or less than 
the mean urban homogeneity with respect to 
districts in a given decade. 
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  Results Table 3 
 
 Coefficient Std.  Error 
Urban Homogeneity -0.1267613*** 0.0281148 
Urban Homogeneity
2
 0.1124207*** 0.0216749 
Incumbency 0.0396652*** 0.0024948 
Redistricting 0.0113529*** 0.000603 
Turnout -0.1643307*** 0.0092834 
Constant 0.6576452*** 0.0090761 
 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level.                    Dependent Variable: Vote Margin 
 **  Statistically significant at 5% level 
   *  Statistically significant at 10% level   
 
 
  Marginal Effects Table 1 
 
 ey/ex Std.  Error 
Urban Homogeneity -0.1397996*** 0.03101 
Urban Homogeneity
2
 0.978777*** 0.01887 
Incumbency 0.0552964*** 0.00348 
Redistricting 0.0385291*** 0.00205 
Turnout -0.0935401*** 0.00529 
 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level.                    Dependent Variable: Vote Margin 
 **  Statistically significant at 5% level 
   *  Statistically significant at 10% level   
 
Quadratic Relationships 
 
Quadratic relationships are of the form f(x) = ax
2
 + bx + c such that a and b are numbers not 
equal to zero.  These functions create U-shaped curves (parabolas) where the U is either right side 
up ( f(x) = ax
2
 - bx + c ) or upside down ( f(x) = ax
2
 + bx + c ).  In our case we turn urban 
homogeneity into a U-shaped relationship (quadratic relationship) by using both the variables 
Urban Homogeneity and Urban Homogenity
2
.  Thus, since the sign on Urban Homogeneity is 
negative and is also positive on Urban Homogenity
2
, and both of these variables are statistically 
significant, we can conclude we have a right side up U-shaped relationship (quadratic 
relationship) between Vote Margin and Urban Homogeneity. 
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Chart 8 
Chart 9 
Chart 10 
Model 2 Cross-Sections 
 
By observing cross-sections of our data for 
the winner‟s percentage of the two-party 
vote share and district urban homogeneity 
we can observe how this pattern changes 
over time.  Specifically, note that this 
pattern does appear to be consistent across 
cross-sections of the data and it appears to 
become more pronounced over time. 
 
This persistence of the pattern as well as 
the strengthening of its role would be 
expected if Tiebout Sorting was indeed at 
work. 
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(C) Econometric Analysis III 
 The third econometric analysis undertaken will distinguish between the role of 
traditional and expanded Tiebout Sorting in the United States through a more extensive 
cross-section analysis and much shorter time-series analysis relative to the previous 
investigation.  To perform this analysis we will employ two datasets.  The first dataset 
comes from the National Annenberg Election Survey, a survey that “examines a wide 
range of political attitudes about candidates, issues and the traits Americans want in a 
president” during the 2000 and 2004 United States presidential election cycles during 
which over 100,000 interviews were conducted in each of the two years.
82
   The 
following data have been gathered for use: 
 
i. Household Income 
ii. Adults Per Household 
iii. Children Per Household 
iv. Scale of Conservative to Liberal Self-Identification 
v. Race 
vi. Education 
vii. Occupation 
 
 
These data are being used to distinguish between traditional and expanded Tiebout 
Sorting.  We can separate these into three categories: economic sorting, ideological 
sorting, and public goods sorting.  Consider the common measures of socioeconomic 
status: 
 
The most commonly used measures of  [socioeconomic status are] 
income, education, and occupational status, or some combination of the 
three…[and] the use of multiple measures of SES and the search for  
alternative SES measures is an important direction for future work. 
Although income is the most widely used SES measure of available 
                                                 
82
 National Annenberg Election Survey: 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/ProjectDetails.aspx?myId=1 
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economic resources, it may not be the most appropriate. A measure of 
total household income is a useful but limited indicator of all the economic 
resources available to a selected respondent in a given household. This 
suggests, at a minimum, that researchers would do well to use a per capita 
income measure…[however], years of formal education is probably the 
most practical and convenient indicator. 
     (Williams, Lavizzo-Mourey, and Warren 1994
83
) 
 
 
Thus, a commonly employed measure of socioeconomic sorting is being implemented 
through the use of occupation, education, and household income (which has been made 
per capita through controlling for adults and children in a household).  We must further 
control for race, as socioeconomic status “is transformed by racism” and consequently 
“occupation, education, and household income are not equivalent across race” (Williams, 
Lavizzo-Mourey, and Warren 1994
84
).  These variables will comprise the economic 
sorting category.  Ideological sorting will be measured through the scale of conservative 
to liberal self-identification.  Finally, public goods sorting will be studied through 
children per household, as traditional Tiebout Sorting for parents seeking a good 
education for their children is a recognized phenomenon (Epple, Figlio, and Romano 
2004
85
; Caroline Hoxby 2000
86
; Fernaindez and Rogerson 1998
87
; Hoxby 1999
88
; 
Nechyba 1999
89
; Nechyba 2000
90
).   
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Further, so that these data provide additional evidence of our posited U-shaped 
relationship, the standard deviation amongst individuals within a given district will be 
calculated.  Consider that a decrease in standard deviation denotes increasing 
homogeneity (at either extreme) because it signifies that a larger share of the data more 
closely approaches the average of that district, and an increase in standard deviation 
means the district is more heterogeneous as there is relatively more data dispersed more 
distantly from the average.  It follows that if there exists a negative linear relationship 
between the standard deviation of a given trait and vote margin, this will represent 
evidence in favor of a U-shaped relationship between the two. 
The second source of data will be the Polidata Presidential Results by 
Congressional District 1992-2008 that contains the “collection of election results by 
congressional district [which] provides a variety of presidential and congressional 
election results by congressional district for the 103rd (1992 districts) to the 109th (2004 
Districts) Congress.”  The congressional election data from 2000 and 2004 by district will 
be used such that it corresponds with the National Annenberg Election Survey data.  Like 
the previous dataset, this dataset contains whether there was an incumbent running and, if 
so, their party affiliation.
91
  Further, through the same reasoning as in the previous model, 
the dependent variable VoteMargin will be calculated as the winner‟s percentage of the 
two-party vote share, and the same controls for the incumbency effect, candidate quality, 
whether or not an election is competitive, and the effect of gerrymandering will be 
invoked. 
                                                                                                                                                 
90
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We have chosen variables such that a decrease in standard deviation correlating to 
an increase in vote margin will provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship between a 
given trait and vote margin.  As can be seen in Results Table 4, this model offers 
interesting results.  Notice that we have mixed results with regard to expanded Tiebout 
Sorting.  The ideological portion of spatial sorting, measured through homogeneity along 
a 5-point conservative to liberal scale within a district (Con Lib, SD), is statistically 
insignificant.  Further, two of our three variables for socioeconomic capital have been 
shown to be statistically insignificant: Spatial sorting due to occupation through the 
homogeneity of occupation type in a district (Occupation, SD) and household income 
(Household Income, SD) are both statistically insignificant with relation to the vote 
margin within a district.  This model was repeated in regards to occupation with standard 
deviation from professional worker (lawyer, doctor, scientist, etc), skilled tradesperson 
(printer, baker, tailor, etc), clerical or office worker (typist, secretary, etc), service worker 
(police officer, fire fighter, etc), laborer (plumber‟s helper, construction worker, etc), 
manager (store manager, sales manager, etc), semi-skilled worker (machine operator, 
assembly, etc), salesperson, and business owner, and each time it was not statistically 
significantly related to the vote margin within a district.  However, we can see that as a 
Econometric Equation 2: 
VoteMarginit = β0 + β1sdHHIit + β2sdAPHit + β3sdKPHit + β4sdCONLIBit + β5sdRACEit + β6sdEDUit 
+ β7sdOCCit + β8sdTurnoutit + β9sdIncit + β10sdRedistit + i + δt + it 
 
 Differenced Equation: 
VoteMarginit = β1sdHHIit + β2sdAPHit + β3sdKPHit + β4sdCONLIBit + β5sdRACEit + β6sdEDUit 
+ β7sdOCCit + β8sdTurnoutit + β9sdIncit + β10sdRedistit  + δ + it - it-1 
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district becomes increasingly homogeneous in terms of its education level (Education, 
SD), the vote margin within this district correspondingly increases.  This, as noted earlier, 
is considered the most practical and accurate single measure of socioeconomic capital. 
Moreover, our measure of traditional Tiebout Sorting, homogeneity of households 
with children (Children In Household, SD), provides evidence of the occurrence of 
traditional Tiebout Sorting.  That is, as a district becomes increasingly homogeneous in 
terms of having households with or without children there is a corresponding increase in 
vote margins within this district.   
The variable for racial sorting is statistically significant but does not appear to 
speak to the presence of Tiebout Sorting.  In regards to race (Race, SD), the model was 
repeated with models looking at standard deviation from individuals who identify 
themselves as “White”, “Black”, “Asian”, “American Indian”, and “Other”, as well as a 
combination thereof.  However, the only one of these which was statistically significant 
was that with an emphasis on individuals self-identifying in the “Black” category.  
However, the relationship offered in this case was a decrease in the homogeneity of black 
or non-black within a district correlated to higher vote margins.  This can be explained 
through the unique history of African-Americans in the United States; that is, there has 
been a practice of congressional districts being created to attempt to garner more fair 
African-American participation in government, both through policies of majority-
minority districts and drawing lines in such a way that enough African-Americans are 
present in a district to such a degree that their views are supported (though not 
necessarily through a majority-minority district) (Cameron, Epstein, and O‟Halloran 
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1996
92
; Lublin 1999
93
; Epstein and O‟Halloran 199994; Hutchings, McClerking, and 
Charles 2004
95
). 
 Finally, as in our last model, we have included a check of the integrity of our 
results through controlling for the incumbency effect (Incumbency), for when district 
lines have been redrawn (Redistricting), and for voter turnout (Turnout).  The results 
indicate that each of these is statistically significant in this model also, as would be 
expected through intuition and an examination of the relevant literature. 
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Results Table 4 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error 
Household Income, SD (UT) 0.0001345 0.0001824 
Occupation, SD (UT) 0.0002161 0.0003829 
Education, SD (UT) -0.0004465** 0.0002017 
ConLib, SD (UT) 0.0003464 0.0003604 
Children in Household, SD (CT) -0.0001417* 0.000086 
Race, SD (C) 0.0007702* 0.0004197 
Adults in Household, SD (C) 0.0000412** 0.0000196 
Turnout (C) -0.000000596*** 0.0000000612 
Incumbency (C) 0.0258713*** 0.0093603 
Redistricting (C) -0.0001443*** 0.0000527 
Constant 80.22245*** 1.850583 
 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level.                   Dependent Variable: Vote Margin 
 **  Statistically significant at 5% level                    SD denotes that these variables have been transformed  
   *  Statistically significant at 10% level.                 such that the standard deviation has been calculated as a  
                                                                                  meaningful measurement of homogeneity in the given area. 
      (UT) denotes Expanded Tiebout Sorting 
      (CT) denotes Traditional Tiebout Sorting 
      (C) denotes control variable 
 
 
Marginal Effects Table 2 
 
 ey/ex Std. Error 
Household Income, SD (UT) 0.000362 0.00049 
Occupation, SD (UT) 0.0000664 0.00012 
Education, SD (UT) -0.001401** 0.00063 
ConLib, SD (UT) 0.0004728 0.00049 
Children in Household, SD (CT) -0.000239* 0.00014 
Race, SD (C) 0.0002461* 0.00013 
Adults in Household, SD (C) 0.0000833** 0.00004 
Turnout (C) -0.235515*** 0.02416 
Incumbency (C) 0.0350385*** 0.01268 
Redistricting (C) -0.000111*** 0.00004 
 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level.                   Dependent Variable: Vote Margin 
 **  Statistically significant at 5% level                    SD denotes that these variables have been transformed  
   *  Statistically significant at 10% level.                 such that the standard deviation has been calculated as a  
                                                                                  meaningful measurement of homogeneity in the given area. 
      (UT) denotes Expanded Tiebout Sorting 
      (CT) denotes Traditional Tiebout Sorting 
      (C) denotes control variable 
 
Standard Deviations 
 
A standard deviation is a 
measurement of how closely a 
set of data is spread out relative 
to the average of the dataset.  
Specifically, it is calculated by 
taking each data point in the 
dataset, subtracting the average 
of the dataset from it, squaring 
the result of this, and then 
dividing the sum all of these by 
one less than the total number 
of data points.   
 
Thus, if there is a smaller 
standard deviation it implies the 
data is more clustered together 
(more homogeneous relative to 
the mean) and if there is a larger 
standard deviation the data is 
relatively less clustered together 
(more heterogeneous relative to 
the mean).  Thus, standard 
deviation can be used as a 
meaningful measure of 
homogeneity. 
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V. Summary and Discussion  
An overview of our methodology and results suggests that there does exist a trend 
stationary pattern of increasing vote margins driven by traditional and expanded Tiebout 
Sorting.  First, we have found a long-term trend stationary pattern of increasing vote 
margins.  This was followed by the discovery that within a subset of the trend, 1942 to 
1992, a blunt measurement of Tiebout Sorting through the application of urban-rural 
differences, soliciting information regarding age, class, gender, income, occupation, and 
race while measuring preferences for public goods through an individual‟s vote, was 
statistically significant.  Finally, we identified evidence of Tiebout Sorting of both the 
traditional variety (sorting based on public goods provided) and the economic, but not 
ideological, portion of the expanded variety (spatial sorting by ideological and economic 
factors).  Succinctly, each of our three hypotheses is supported: 
 
Hypothesis 1: If the margin by which a candidate wins in a given district  
increases, then we will observe a corresponding increase in the  
homogeneity of preferences of consumer-voters within that specific  
district.  The reverse will hold as well. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The pattern identified in the first hypothesis is driven by  
both traditional and expanded Tiebout Sorting. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The observation made by David Mayhew is a portion of a 
longer trend stationary pattern in an increase in vote margins. 
 
 
These findings raise an important question: How robust is the literature on Tiebout 
Sorting and the Vanishing Marginals?  Through the use of a different methodology we 
show that Tiebout Sorting can be observed when we recognize the role of the political 
system as a body that mediates preferences between individuals and services provided by 
government; this is something previous studies on Tiebout Sorting have not done.  
   Pizzola  38 
Further, we call into question the completeness of a traditional view of Tiebout Sorting; 
we introduce and show the significance of the sorting of public goods preferences 
through economic factors (expanded Tiebout Sorting) independent of sorting due to 
public goods preferences (traditional Tiebout Sorting).  Finally, by showing that the 
pattern of increasing vote margins spans the entire twentieth century and providing a 
causal mechanism that explains the change throughout its entire course, we find the use a 
one-shot explanation, many of the explanations commonly used in the Vanishing 
Marginals literature, is insufficient.  
 While this study critiques the existing literatures regarding Tiebout Sorting and 
the Vanishing Marginals, it also fits well into each of their structures.  The fact that the 
observation of the actual act and implications of Tiebout Sorting is disputed would be 
expected through the use of the currently common and flawed methodology.  That is, the 
result of ascertaining whether or not there has been an increase in stratification for given 
public goods over time is dependent on how local political institutions mediate 
preferences between individuals and actual implemented policy; consequently, we would 
expect to find evidence, or lack thereof, in some local contexts and not in others even if 
this phenomenon were happening in all of them.  Thus, it logically follows that the use of 
the currently common methodology would lead to a contentious and disputed literature.  
Further, our study supports the influence of the one-shot trends common in the Vanishing 
Marginal literature; we have used them as control variables and found them to be 
statistically significant.  Therefore, while our frame is one of trends in political economy 
as opposed to narrow one-shot explanations, we do find, as the literature would suggest, 
many of these one-shot explanations influencing vote margins.  
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We have come to this conclusion through the implementation of three models, 
each with its own strength supporting part of the overall picture.  However, there is an 
important assumption being made: the mechanisms of Tiebout Sorting have remained 
consistent over time.  This assumption is made in that our observed trend in increasing 
vote margins occurs from 1900 to 1992; however, our data bluntly measuring Tiebout 
Sorting covers only the time period of 1942 to 1992.  Further, it can be seen through our 
assumption that the dynamics in our in-depth study of change in vote margins between 
2000 and 2004 are applicable both to our blunt measurement and to the trend generally.  
We should note, however, that this assumption is not a radically strong one; the literature 
explaining the increase in vote margins does not offer a mechanism for an observed trend 
encompassing the vast majority of the twentieth century.  It offers mainly one-shot 
changes in the 1950 to 1970 time range.  Furthermore, since we have found that this 
pattern is trend stationary, it is unlikely that the increase in vote margins is a result of one 
or several one-shot shocks. 
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Appendix 
I.   Model Specification – Regression I  
This section will provide the raw results and econometric considerations for 
model specification of the first regression (Model II).  One of the major benefits of panel 
data is the ability to deal with unobserved heterogeneity, a problem nearly always present 
in cross-section data.  That is, we are able to control for heterogeneity that is constant 
over time and is correlated to the independent variables.  However, if the individual 
specific effect is not correlated to the independent variables, the Random Effects model is 
more efficient.  Thus, we must test to find the best model specification.  We will proceed 
as follows.  First, we will provide the simple pooled OLS results as a benchmark and test 
it against the Random Effects model to determine which is the better model specification.  
Second, we will obtain the results from the Fixed Effects model and test this against the 
Random Effects model.  Note that we do not need to test the Fixed Effects model against 
the simple pooled OLS model if the Random Effects model is demonstrated to be a better 
model specification than the simple pooled OLS model. 
 
The results of a simple pooled OLS are as follows: 
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The results of a Random Effects Model are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next, we will test for whether the simple pooled OLS model or the Random Effects 
model is more appropriate for this specification: 
  
 
Since the result of the Breusch-Pagan Test is Prob > chi
2
 = 0.0000, we reject the null 
hypothesis and find that the Random Effects model is more appropriate to use than the 
pooled OLS model.  We can now compare the Random Effects model to the Fixed 
Effects model, where we do not have to assume E(x'c)=0.   
 
H0: var(u) = 0 and there are no random 
effects: use pooled OLS. 
 
HA: var(u) is not equal to 0: pooled OLS is 
not appropriate to use. 
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The results of a first differences Fixed Effects model are as follow: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now use a Hausman Test to decide whether the Fixed Effects model or the Random 
Effects model is a more appropriate model specification: 
 
  
 
Since we have a statistically significant result, Prob > chi
2
 = 0.0000, we reject the null 
hypothesis and should use the Fixed Effects model. 
H0: Difference in coefficients not systematic: 
use Random Effects model 
 
HA: Difference in coefficients systematic: use 
Fixed Effects model 
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The marginal effects are as follow: 
 
 
II.   Model Specification – Regression II 
 
 
As this second regression (Model III) also employs panel data, we follow the same 
procedure as Regression I. 
 
The results of a simple pooled OLS are as follows: 
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The results of a Random Effects Model are as follows: 
 
 
 
Next, we will test for whether the pooled OLS model or the Random Effects model is 
more appropriate for this specification: 
 
  
 
Since the result of the Breusch-Pagan Test is Prob > chi
2
 = 0.0000, we reject the null 
hypothesis and find that the Random Effects model is more appropriate to use than the 
pooled OLS model.  We can now compare the Random Effects model to the Fixed 
Effects model, where we do not have to assume E(x'c)=0.   
 
 
 
 
H0: var(u) = 0 and there are no random 
effects: use pooled OLS. 
 
HA: var(u) is not equal to 0: pooled OLS is 
not appropriate to use. 
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The results of a first differences Fixed Effects model are as follow: 
 
 
 
 
We now use a Hausman Test to decide whether the Fixed Effects model or the Random 
Effects model is a more appropriate model specification; note, however, that there is a 
complication: 
 
 
  
H0: Difference in coefficients not systematic: 
use Random Effects model 
 
HA: Difference in coefficients systematic: use 
Fixed Effects model 
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Thus, we report the Hausman Test with both the sigamore and sigmaless options: 
 
Sigmamore: 
 
 
 
Sigmaless: 
 
 
Since, for both sigmamore and sigmaless, we have a statistically significant result at the 
one-percent level, Prob > chi
2
 = 0.0001, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that 
we should employ the Fixed Effects model. 
The marginal effects are as follow: 
 
 
   Pizzola  47 
III. Time-Series Analysis of Mean Vote Margins 
 
 
There are a variety of tests available to ascertain whether there exists a unit root 
within a pattern.  Further, there are also a number of tests to determine how many lags 
should be used in these unit root tests.  Typically one would choose both the unit root test 
and criterion to determine the number of lags that is common in the literature in which 
one is conducting research.  However, no one has previously written on either of these in 
regards to the Vanishing Marginals literature.  As such, for the sake of robustness, we 
choose two of the most prominently used unit root tests, the Augmented Dicker-Fuller 
(ADF) and the Dickey-Fuller GLS (ERS) tests, as well as two commonly used methods 
to determine number of lags, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz 
information criterion (BIC).  We will proceed as follows.  First, we will conduct the 
Augmented Dicker-Fuller test for a unit root using the AIC and then the BIC to determine 
the optimal lag length.  Second, we will employ the Dickey-Fuller GLS test, once again 
invoking the AIC and then the BIC to derive the optimal lag length.  The results will be 
provided in raw form such that one can interpret the conclusions drawn by this study. 
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(1) AIC, Augmented Dickey-Fuller  Null Not Rejected at 5% Level 
(Unit Root; Difference Stationary) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: MeanVoteMargin has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.005906  0.1417 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.170583  
 5% level  -3.510740  
 10% level  -3.185512  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(MeanVoteMargin)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1990 1992   
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
MeanVoteMargin(-1) -0.348857 0.116057 -3.005906 0.0044 
C 0.210743 0.069673 3.024756 0.0042 
@TREND(1947) 0.000313 0.000190 1.649237 0.1064 
     
     
R-squared 0.174403     Mean dependent var 0.000894 
Adjusted R-squared 0.136004     S.D. dependent var 0.014604 
S.E. of regression 0.013575     Akaike info criterion -5.698194 
Sum squared resid 0.007924     Schwarz criterion -5.578935 
Log likelihood 134.0585     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.653519 
F-statistic 4.541775     Durbin-Watson stat 1.994336 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.016237    
     
     
 
 
   Pizzola  49 
(2) BIC, Augmented Dickey-Fuller  Null Not Rejected at 5% Level 
(Unit Root; Difference Stationary)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: MeanVoteMargin has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.005906  0.1417 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.170583  
 5% level  -3.510740  
 10% level  -3.185512  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(MeanVoteMargin)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1900 1992   
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
MeanVoteMargin(-1) -0.348857 0.116057 -3.005906 0.0044 
C 0.210743 0.069673 3.024756 0.0042 
@TREND(1947) 0.000313 0.000190 1.649237 0.1064 
     
     
R-squared 0.174403     Mean dependent var 0.000894 
Adjusted R-squared 0.136004     S.D. dependent var 0.014604 
S.E. of regression 0.013575     Akaike info criterion -5.698194 
Sum squared resid 0.007924     Schwarz criterion -5.578935 
Log likelihood 134.0585     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.653519 
F-statistic 4.541775     Durbin-Watson stat 1.994336 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.016237    
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(3) AIC, Dickey-Fuller GLS (ERS)  Null Not Rejected at 5% Level  
(Unit Root; Difference Stationary) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: MeanVoteMargin has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
     
    t-Statistic 
     
     
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS test statistic -3.071336 
Test critical values: 1% level   -3.770000 
 5% level   -3.190000 
 10% level   -2.890000 
     
     
*Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (1996, Table 1)  
Warning: Test critical values calculated for 50 observations 
                 and may not be accurate for a sample size of 46 
     
     
DF-GLS Test Equation on GLS Detrended Residuals 
Dependent Variable: D(GLSRESID)  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1900 1992   
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
GLSRESID(-1) -0.348040 0.113319 -3.071336 0.0036 
     
     
R-squared 0.173265     Mean dependent var -8.97E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173265     S.D. dependent var 0.014604 
S.E. of regression 0.013279     Akaike info criterion -5.783773 
Sum squared resid 0.007935     Schwarz criterion -5.744020 
Log likelihood 134.0268     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.768881 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.993394    
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BIC, Dickey-Fuller GLS (ERS)  Null Not Rejected at 5% Level  
(Unit Root; Difference Stationary) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: MeanVoteMargin has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
     
    t-Statistic 
     
     
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS test statistic -3.071336 
Test critical values: 1% level   -3.770000 
 5% level   -3.190000 
 10% level   -2.890000 
     
     
*Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (1996, Table 1)  
Warning: Test critical values calculated for 50 observations 
                 and may not be accurate for a sample size of 46 
     
     
DF-GLS Test Equation on GLS Detrended Residuals 
Dependent Variable: D(GLSRESID)  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1900 1992   
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
GLSRESID(-1) -0.348040 0.113319 -3.071336 0.0036 
     
     
R-squared 0.173265     Mean dependent var -8.97E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173265     S.D. dependent var 0.014604 
S.E. of regression 0.013279     Akaike info criterion -5.783773 
Sum squared resid 0.007935     Schwarz criterion -5.744020 
Log likelihood 134.0268     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.768881 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.993394    
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IV. Panel Analysis of Mean Vote Margins 
 
 
With ambiguous results, we turn to the panel unit root tests, as they are more 
powerful tests.  However, like the above Time-Series Analysis of Mean Vote Margins, 
there is no precedence as to which unit root tests and optimal lag criterion should be 
employed within the Vanishing Marginals literature.  As such, we choose to use the 
Fisher ADF and Fisher PP for two reasons.  First, panel unit root tests of the Fisher 
variety do not require balanced panel data.  Second, using both the Fisher ADF and 
Fisher PP tests will provide a check for robustness.  Further, we choose to use the AIC 
for determining the number of lags used in each time-series section of the panel data.  
While using this criterion we find that the optimal lag fluctuates between 0 and 3 for each 
time-series section of the panel data.  Thus, we will use the maximum optimal lag found 
of all time-series sections for testing the entirety of the panel data as has been commonly 
practiced in econometrics (Österholm 2004
96
).  Below is provided the Fisher ADF and 
Fisher PP for 0 through 3 lags, each delivering the same conclusion.  Like the previous 
sections of the appendix, the results are provided in raw form such that this study‟s 
interpretation of the results can be more fully understood. 
                                                 
96
 Österholm, P. (2004), “Killing Four Unit Root Birds in the US Economy with Three Panel Unit Root 
Test Stones.” Applied Economics Letters 11(4), 213-216. 
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Since for the maximum optimal number lag for any of the time-series sections of the 
panel data the null hypothesis that there exists a unit root, both for the Fisher ADF and 
Fisher PP tests, is rejected, we have shown that this data does not contain a unit root. 
 
 
 
H0: There is a unit root. 
 
HA: There is not a unit root. 
